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lmost two decades have passed since three Hamas suicide bombers blew
themselves up on a crowded pedestrian street in central Jerusalem, killing five
and wounding nearly 200 people.2 Among the dead and wounded were a number
of American citizens.3 Hamas claimed responsibility for the bombing, and because Iran
provided terrorist training and economic assistance to Hamas, some of the victims and
their families brought suit for compensatory and punitive damages against the Islamic
Republic of Iran and senior Iranian officials.4 The defendants failed to appear or respond
to the complaints; the Clerk of Court entered default judgments against the defendants;
and, in 2003, in two consolidated actions, a D.C. federal court awarded $71.5 million in
compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive damages.5

The plaintiffs in those cases, known collectively at the Rubin plaintiffs, tried to enforce
the judgment first by attaching the U.S. bank accounts of the Consulate General of Iran,6
but because of a previous lien, the Rubin plaintiffs received nothing.7 Next, they attached
and sold U.S. property owned by the then-Crown Prince of Iran, yielding just $390,000.8
With a mere 1/500th of the original judgment satisfied, the Rubin plaintiffs tried a new
approach: attaching and executing Persian antiquities held in museum collections across
the United States. Targeting the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago and the
Field Museum of Natural History in Illinois9 and Harvard University, several Harvard
University art museums, and the Museum of Fine Arts in Massachusetts,10 the plaintiffs
hoped to auction off the antiquities, covering their judgment award with the proceeds.
In Illinois, the Rubin plaintiffs sought to attach the Persepolis, the Chogha Mish,11
and the Herzfeld Collections.12 The plaintiffs alleged that the collections were subject
1 Gabrielle Goodwin is a Lecturer at Maurer School of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington. This article discusses the
recent developments in the Rubin cases, first described in Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran: Legal Threats to Cultural
Property, (December 21, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1581670.
2 Campuzano v. Islamic Republic Of Iran, 281 F.Supp.2d 258, 261 (D.D.C. 2003).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 261-62.
5 Id. at 272-77.
6 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2005 WL 670770 (D.D.C. 2005), at *1.
7 See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Ill. (East. Div.), Case No. 03-CV-9370, Pls.’
Consol. Mem. of Law (Docket #105), at 5.
8 Ill. Lit., Pls.’ Consol. Mem. of Law (Docket #105), at 5 & nn.3, 4.
9 Rubin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2011).
10 Rubin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 456 F.Supp.2d 228, 230 (D. Mass. 2006).
11 The Persepolis and Chogha Mish Collections are antiquities recovered in the 1930s and 1960s by University of
Chicago archaeologists and loaned to the Oriental Institute by Iran for long-term study. The collections must be returned to
Iran when study is complete, and, in fact, parts of these collections have been returned already. Rubin, 637 F.3d at 787.
12 The Herzfeld Collection was purchased by the Field Museum from archaeologist Ernest Herzfeld, who worked in Persia
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to attachment under two provisions in
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (“FSIA”), which provides generally
that the U.S. property of a foreign state is
immune to attachment unless a statutory
exception applies,13 and one provision of
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
(“TRIA”), which permits the attachment
of certain “blocked assets of [a] terrorist
party.”14 The Oriental Institute and the Field
Museum responded that no exceptions to
immunity apply and that the antiquities
are not blocked assets.15 For their part,
the plaintiffs argued that immunity under
§1609 of FSIA is personal to the foreign
state and must be affirmatively pleaded,
and the court agreed.16 However, two
days before the museums were to file a
motion to certify the order for appeal, Iran
appeared in the district court and asserted
§1609 attachment immunity.17
Iran’s appearance and §1609 immunity
pleading shifted the course of the
proceedings. Iran argued it was entitled to
summary judgment because the plaintiffs
could not execute or attach the Persian
artifacts as a matter of law.18 The Rubin
plaintiffs then moved for further discovery
of all Iranian assets in the United States
to support their argument that immunity
does not apply.19 Declining to rule on
Iran’s motion for summary judgment, the
magistrate judge granted the plaintiffs’
motion to continue discovery.20 Iran
appealed, but the district court overruled
Iran’s objection.21
In 2011, on appeal to the Seventh Circuit,
Iran objected to the general-asset discovery
ordered by the magistrate judge and to
the district court’s earlier order declaring
that §1609 immunity is not presumptively
in the early twentieth century. Iran has never claimed
ownership of the collection. Id.
13 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C.
§§1602-1611.
14 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), Pub.L.
No. 107-297, §201(a).
15 Rubin, 637 F.3d at 787.
16 Id. at 787-88.
17 Id. at 788.
18 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2007 WL 1169701
(N.D. Ill 2007), at *2.
19 Id.
20 Id. at *14.
21 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2007 WL 2219105
(N.D. Ill 2007), at *6.
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recognized but must be asserted by the
foreign state itself.22 Declaring both orders
to be incompatible with the FSIA and in
conflict with relevant precedent, the court
reversed the district court’s orders and
remanded for further proceedings.23 In
2012, the Rubin plaintiffs’ writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court of the United States
appealing the circuit court’s decision was
denied.24
While such an outcome might seem to be
the end of a very long road for the Rubin
plaintiffs, in fact, three substantive issues
are now being considered by the federal
courts in Illinois. In early 2014, further
to the plaintiffs’ attempts to attach and
execute on a number of artifacts held by
the Oriental Institute of the University of
Chicago and the Field Museum of Natural
History, the museums and Iran moved for
summary judgment, arguing there is no
legal basis for attachment.25 The district
court agreed and held that (1) a U.S.
museum is not an agent of Iran for purposes
of the commercial activity exception to the
FSIA 26; (2) subsection 1610(g) of the FSIA
may allow creditors to satisfy a judgment
by attaching assets, but only if those assets
have lost immunity under other provisions
in the statute; and (3) attachment was
not permitted pursuant to TRIA because
the artifacts were not “blocked assets.”27
Thus, the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment was granted.28
As of this writing in early 2015, the
plaintiffs have appealed, and the parties
have filed their briefs in the United
State Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit and are awaiting a date for oral
arguments. The Rubin plaintiffs’ (A/K/A
Judgment creditors-appellants) argument
centers largely on the canons of statutory
interpretation and a plain reading of the
text.29 “In its use of the passive voice in
22 Rubin, 637 F.3d at 784.
23 Id. at 794, 801.
24 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 133 S.Ct. 23 (2012).
25 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 33 F.Supp.3d 1003,
1007 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
26 Id. at 1008-11.
27 Id.at 1013-14.
28 Id. at 1015-16.
29 The text at issue is Section 1610(a) of the FSIA: “The
property in the United States of a foreign state … used
for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not
be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from
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Section 1610(a) Congress instructed that
anyone’s use will suffice,” and, further, the
“Supreme Court has found that Congress
employs a passive voice to indicate
that a statute [sic] to be read broadly.”30
Specifically, the plaintiffs assert, the
statute does not require that a foreign
state’s property be used in commercial
activity only by the foreign state defendant
to qualify as an exception to immunity
from attachment.
The text of §1610(g) is also at issue.31
The plaintiffs argue that because the
phrase “as provided in this section” comes
at the end of the opening paragraph
of subsection (g), the phrase does not
modify property (i.e., that the kinds of
property subject to attachment are limited
to those identified in subsections (a) and
(b)), “but rather refers to non-substantive
rules related to attachment and execution
(i.e., that attachment must be conducted
in accordance with those rules).”32 In
their final argument, the Rubin plaintiffs
assert that the First Circuit’s 2013 ruling,
in a parallel case, that the antiquities
in question were not “blocked assets,”
subject to attachment under TRIA, is not
dispositive.33
In Massachusetts, the Rubin plaintiffs
followed a parallel line of litigation, similar
to that in Illinois, attempting to attach
antiquities to satisfy the original default
judgment against Iran. In 2005, the
plaintiffs moved for orders of attachment
by trustee process against all “antiquities34
… that are the property of the Islamic
execution upon a judgment entered by a court of the
United States…” Reply Brief for the Judgment CreditorsAppellants at 1, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No.
03-cv-9370 (7th Cir. Dec. 4, 2014).
30 Id. at 9-10.
31 Section 1610(g) provides in part: “…[T]he property of
a foreign state against which a judgment is entered under
section 1605A, and the property of an agency or instrumentality of such a state, including property that is a separate juridical entity or is an interest held directly or indirectly
in a separate juridical entity, is subject to attachment in aid
of execution, and execution, upon that judgment as provided in this section,…” 28 U.S.C. §1610(g)(1) (2012).
32 Reply Brief for the Judgment Creditors-Appellants at 28.
33 Id. at 31.
34 These antiquities include about 500 objects held by
Harvard and its museums and about 1,485 objects held by
the Boston Museum of Fine Arts. The objects originated in
or near the current borders of Iran and include “stone reliefs, sculptures, and archaeological specimens.” Id. at 51.

Republic of Iran in the possession of the
Museums.35 The Museums moved to
quash the trustee process summonses and
dissolve the attachments, arguing that the
antiquities were immune under the FSIA,
and the plaintiffs responded with much
the same argument used in the Illinois
litigation.36 The district court decided
the FSIA’s “commercial use” exception
did not apply, but concluded that the
antiquities might be attached under TRIA
if the plaintiffs could prove the antiquities
belonged to Iran.37 The First Circuit denied
the parties’ petitions for leave to appeal
until the question of ownership could be
ascertained. The Museums again moved
to dissolve the attachments, and this time,
the district court found that because the
plaintiffs had not met their burden of
proving that any of the objects in dispute
belonged to Iran, the motion was granted.38
On February 27, 2013, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed the district court’s ruling,
denying the Rubin plaintiffs’ motion for
order of attachment by trustee process
and granting the Museums’39 motions to
dissolve the attachments.40 However, the
circuit court disagreed with the district
court’s ruling that the antiquities qualify
as “blocked assets” under TRIA.41 To
be considered a blocked asset, the asset
first must be “contested,” where Iran has
claimed an interest or partial interest in
the asset. In this case, unlike the Illinois
case, Iran has never made a claim to any of
the antiquities at issue, and, therefore, they
cannot be considered contested and do not
qualify as blocked assets.”42

35 Id.
36 The plaintiffs made three arguments: (1) The Museums
did not have standing to assert sovereign immunity on
behalf of Iran; (2) even if they did, the “commercial use”
exception to immunity under the FSIA would apply; and (3)
in any event, the plaintiffs could reach the antiquities under
TRIA. Id.
37 Rubin, 456 F.Supp.2d at 236.
38 Rubin, 709 F.3d at 51-52.
39 “The Museums” here refers to Harvard University and
its museums as well as the Boston Museum of Fine Arts.
40 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 709 F.3d 49, 50 (1st
Cir. 2013).
41 Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 541 F.Supp.2d 416
(D. Mass. 2008)
42 Rubin, 709 F.3d at 56-58.
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Two years later, it is unclear if the
Massachusetts Rubin case will proceed in
any form, and just how persuasive, if at
all, the Illinois courts will find it. These
cases present complicated legal issues for
the courts to consider, within an extremely
difficult context. While most people are
sympathetic to the plight of the victims
and their efforts at reaching the judgment
they were awarded, attaching and selling
off antiquities to the highest bidder is
not likely to garner these victims much
support. Perhaps, the Rubin plaintiffs
will find other means to satisfy the initial
judgment. In November 2013, a federal
court in the Southern District of California
issued an order granting lien claimants’
motion to attach a judgment.43 The lien
claimants are the Rubin plaintiffs, and they
were awarded title to over $9 million as a
result of a dispute between Iran and Cubic
Defense Systems, a contractor working
with Iran.44 However, despite title in the
funds vesting immediately, the plaintiffs
will not receive any disbursement until
the completion of the appeal.45 Satisfaction
for the Rubin plaintiffs still appears to be a
long time coming. u

43 Ministry of Def. & Support for Armed Forces of Islamic
Republic of Iran v. Cubic Def. Sys., Inc., 984 F. Supp. 2d
1070 (S.D. Cal. 2013).
44 Id. at 1073.
45 Id. at 1074.
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